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The Ubiquity of State Fragility: Fault lines in the categorisation and 
conceptualisation of Failed and Fragile States 
Introduction 
 
In the last three decades, the categories of failed, fragile or weak states (broadly subsumed within 
the idea of state fragility) have gained much importance in the fields of law, development, peace 
and conflict studies, political science and international relations. At the heart of this discourse is a 
curious link between fragility and violence which inverts our common understanding of these two 
terms. In common parlance, fragility and violence are considered antithetical – proclamations of 
fragility [from Latin fragilis, in turn from Proto-Indo-European frangere: ‘to break’] (Couldrey and 
Herson, 2013) are reminders about the precariousness of equilibriums, instability of situations, 
vulnerability of individuals or about the delicate nature of artefacts. Fragility demands that violence 
be kept at bay, for violence can reduce the stable into fragile and diminish the fragile into non-
existent. Assertions of fragility, then, do not invite violence, but are reminders of treading with 
caution to prevent a breakdown of any (un)stable equilibrium. 
 
In matters of state fragility, however, the discourse assumes the reverse. Here, fragility is taken as 
foundational to violence and as a problem in its own right which at times may even need to be 
violently corrected. Fragile States are considered the ‘breeding ground for terrorism’ (Kaplan, 2008: 
4), a cause of underdevelopment, and a ‘menace not only to [its] own people, but also to their own 
neighbours, and indeed the world’ (Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan quoted in Grimm et al., 
2014: 200). This violent fragility, we are told, is to be treated and rooted out from the legal-political 
sphere like a ‘degenerative disease’ (Hill, 2005: 148). State fragility is deemed not just as a symptom 
of social/legal/political problems, but as a problem in itself that invites a diverse set of prescriptions. 
Development practitioners, aid organisations and international donors suggest financial and 
technological aid, institution building, strengthening of governance infrastructure or reinforcing the 
civil society as some possible solutions (Gisselquist, 2017); international political actors recommend 
state building through incentives and penalties and, if needed in extreme cases, armed intervention 
and occupation (Krasner, 2004).  
 
There are three key normative ideas and assumptions on which this narrative of state fragility rests. 
First is the rather obvious notion that the political entity called the state has some responsibilities, 
the non-fulfilment of which implies that the state has become fragile. While the formal-legal right to 
sovereignty may remain in many cases, the effective authority, capability of governance and the 
ability or even the desire to cater to citizens’ demands may be lacking (Thürer, 1999). Linked to this, 
the second assumption suggests that state fragility, understood as the absence of stability, will lead 
to complete failure and collapse of the state in question if not addressed effectively or immediately. 
This could then not only result in (more) violence and underdevelopment for the state’s own 
citizens, but also threaten international peace and security and the safety of stable states and the 
wider international community. Finally, and most significantly, is the idea that fragility of states is an 
aberration within the wider community of stable and strong states. The failed or the fragile state is 
taken as a category that goes against the normalcy of state-citizen and state-state relationships; it is 
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considered an anomaly that needs to be realigned with the international legal-political norm 
(Brooks, 2005). This paper calls these normative assumptions because they evoke and construct a 
certain normative and normalising structure where the fragile or failed state becomes an outlier and 
a dangerous deviation from the norm.  
 
The more common critiques of this dominant understanding of state fragility tend to focus on the 
inadequacy of categories (Bøås and Jennings, 2005), the vagueness of the terminologies (Mazarr, 
2014), the charges of neo-imperialism and historical determinism (Hill, 2005), or even the problems 
with measuring and quantification of this phenomenon (Bhuta, 2015; Nay, 2013). These accounts 
either lead to suggestions of various categorisations and formulations as an alternate to the labels of 
failed and fragile states (Call, 2010), or even to calls of abandoning the project altogether. However, 
even within these critical narratives, the normalcy of state stability and success (however defined) 
and the anomalous nature of state fragility remains a key assumption. It is the underlying truth on 
which the structures and engagements of the international political community rests, and it is this 
fundamental notion that the current paper challenges. It is argued here that, contrary to the 
conventional understanding, the fragility of states is not an anomaly, but is a socio-political 
phenomenon that is prevalent and ubiquitous. The normative and normalising assertions that view 
modern states as inherently strong and stable, paint the international community as structured 
along these lines and cast the so-called fragility as an anomaly. But the evidence for an inverted 
reading comes from the same set of rankings and indicators that have been established to diagnose, 
measure, quantify and classify the phenomenon of state fragility.  
 
There are a plethora of indices and categorisations that have emerged in the last decade and a half 
to examine and classify states on the basis of their relative stability and efficacy – a quantification 
trend that can also be witnessed in other areas of global governance (Davis et al., 2015). The Fragile 
States Index (formerly known as the Failed States Index) produced by The Fund for Peace and 
Foreign Policy magazine (The Fund For Peace, 2019), the World Bank’s periodic lists of fragile states 
(World Bank Group, 2019) OECD’s ‘States of Fragility’ Reports (OECD, 2018) and the Index of State 
Weakness prepared by the Brookings Institution (Brookings Institution, 2008) are some of the most 
well-known examples among these. These rankings, indices and reports categorise states on the 
basis of their performances in areas such as protection of religious freedoms, dealing with food 
scarcity, GDP growth, curtailment of corruption, perceived legitimacy of the state, presence of riots 
and protests, responses to human rights violations, presence of political freedoms and civil liberties, 
periodic elections, and absence of conflicts and militancy, among many others. The insights offered 
by this paper are based on a detailed analysis of the development of the conceptual foundations of 
these indicators. 
 
While a number of accounts focus on the problems of quantification and measurement within these 
indicators (Bhuta, 2015; Newman, 2007; Hehir, 2007), a critical and theoretical analysis of these 
matrices brings to light three crucial aspects that the current study takes as its departure point. First, 
the formulas and conceptual paradigms in these indicators show that fragility of states is far more 
ubiquitous than is generally recognised, and that the so-called successful and stable states are the 
historical, political and geographical anomaly. Second, in the absence of an agreed definition of a 
successful state or even that of a failed or fragile state, the indicators generally rely on negative 
definitions to delineate the failed and fragile state. They generally suggest that their reading is built 
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on a Weberian ideal-typical state, which takes the idea of monopoly over legitimate violence as the 
starting point, but develops it further to include the responsibilities of a modern state dealing with 
provision of social goods. The third and final point suggests that the indicators and rankings, 
misconstruing the Weberian ideal-typical state, actually end up comparing fragile states against an 
ideal-mythical state. The paper argues that this notional state is not only a-historical and a-political, 
but it also carries the same undertones that have been the hallmark of linear development theory, 
colonialism and imperialism.  
 
The structure of the paper is built around the step-wise development of the three arguments 
mentioned above. The next section will briefly discuss the persistence and the significance of the 
fragile states category and highlight the significance of as well as the conceptual ambiguity 
associated with the concept. The paper will then briefly discuss the various indices and rankings that 
have emerged to measure the fragility or weakness of state, a detailed analysis of which provides 
the insights mentioned here. By way of quantifying the complex socio-legal phenomena of state 
fragility and in their attempt to bridge the gap between academic scholarship and policy 
interventions, these indicators create a certain normative environment in which the binaries of 
successful-failed or strong-fragile states play out. This will be followed by the critical account of 
these indicators, focussing on the problems with regards to their attempts at normalisation, lack of 
context and of the construction of a certain normative ideal. This will then be followed by a 
conclusion. 
 
The elusiveness of State Fragility 
 
In the field(s) of law, the state has traditionally been considered a matter of sovereignty and of the 
right to govern, rather than an issue of efficacy and fragility (Donnelly, 2014). This means that in law, 
and particularly in international law, the state is generally taken as a binary category pertaining to 
the legitimate right to rule which is either present or absent (Engelhardt, 2018), and which generally 
precludes a discussion on state fragility. This conventional understanding of juridical idea of state as 
distinct from any empirical or socio-legal manifestation of it only underestimates the implications 
that the ‘fragile state’ label has on social, legal and political spheres. While it is not possible here to 
chart out the many reasons why fragile states should be taken seriously as a legally significant 
category, this paper proceeds on the assumption that the state fragility is an increasingly important 
idea for discourses on law, state and sovereignty for at least two reasons: First, due to the alleged 
effects that state fragility has on socio-political and economic environments of a given state and 
society; and second, the notional implications of fragility for international legal actors and for the 
fragile states themselves. This topic is also important because, as it will be discussed below, it is 
inextricably linked with the histories and politics of imperialism and colonialism, which cannot be 
separated either from international law (Anghie, 2005) or from the analysis of domestic normative 
orderings in postcolonial societies themselves (Saeed, 2018). 
 
The importance of delving into the debates on conceptualisations and classifications of failed and 
fragile states, therefore, stems not just from political and academic interests, but due to the fact 
that these categories feed into discussions on foreign policy, international humanitarian and criminal 
law, development assistance, financial aid and international investment. Institutions such as OECD, 
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the World Bank and other donor organisations have been known to take decisions based on these 
indicators and categorisations of the state, even if they rely on their own data to suggest alternate 
classifications. In fact, the proposal for the first OECD States of Fragility Report expressly mentioned 
that ‘the donor community is increasingly concerned about the implications for international 
stability and development progress (in line with the MDGs) resulting from state failure or state 
fragility’ (OECD, 2005: 3). The focus on results is an inevitable outcome of the resource flows in the 
name of fragility – in 2011, the Overseas Development Aid to states labelled as fragile by OECD was 
to the tune of US$53 billion (Gisselquist, 2017). Similarly, in the post conflict period in Uganda, 
international donors contributed to around 50-60% of the country’s budget between 1992 and 2005 
(Fisher, 2014). At the same time, the labels of fragile or failed state also play a key role in foreign 
policy decisions to delineate which countries are seen as threats to international peace and security 
or which countries are to be sanctioned. This was evident, for instance, in the case of air strikes and 
imposition of a no-fly zone over Libya in 2011. While informing the UK parliament about the military 
action taken by UK by virtue of UN Resolution 1973, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom 
stated that ‘the consequences for Europe of a failed pariah state on its southern border…are simply 
too great to ignore’ (HC Debates, 2011). 
 
Despite the significance and its impact, however, the concept of state fragility is notoriously difficult 
to pin down. While there are questions as to whether the category is used selectively by 
international community and donors to further their own policy goals (Bøås and Jennings, 2007), 
even at the conceptual level there is a lack of consensus on the definition of this phenomenon. The 
idea of fragile states started life as the category of failed states that goes back to at least the 1990s, 
when the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the crises on the African continent 
and the conflict in the Balkans required a different category of analysis by the development and 
security communities. It was around this time that scholars such as Helman and Ratner (1992) 
proposed the term ‘failed states’ and Zartman (1995) suggested ‘collapsed states’. The discourse 
was given a further boost after 9/11, and in 2002 the US National Security Strategy expressly stated 
that fragility was more dangerous for the interests of the United States than other states (The Fund 
For Peace, 2006). And, arguably, it fed into the discussions on the Responsibility to Protect that were 
gaining prominence at the time (although the 2005 World Summit document does not mention 
failed or fragile states while referring to R2P, the idea that certain states may be unable to fulfil their 
responsibilities leaving residual responsibility on the international community carries the same logic 
and tone as the fragile states discourse). Over the last two and a half decades, the move from the 
label of failed state – which was deemed unhelpful as it conveyed a sense of finality and a binary 
distinction between successful and failed states – towards notions of weak states, quasi states  
(Jackson, 1998), collapsed states, shadow states and fragile states and finally to ‘state fragility’ or 
‘situations of fragility’, is largely an attempt at conceptual refinement of the basic idea itself.  
 
Scholars in the field have attempted to resolve this definitional ambiguity in a variety of different 
ways. Helman and Ratner, who are considered to have used the terminology for the first time, did 
not define the term as such, but suggested that the ‘failed nation state [is] utterly incapable of 
sustaining itself as a member of the international community’ due to civil strife, political instability 
and economic difficulties (1992). Numerous commentators have since presented diverging views on 
demarcating the phenomenon. Focussing on internal conflict, Rotberg suggested that ‘failed states 
are tense, deeply conflicted, dangerous, and bitterly contested by warring factions’ (2009: 85). He 
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adds numerous other factors to the identification of the failed state, including: the endurance of 
violence, communal disharmony, lack of control over borders, a predatory character regarding its 
own citizens, increase in criminal violence, failure to deliver education, health and other political 
goods, deteriorated institutions and infrastructures, heightened corruption, all of which lead to an 
erosion of state legitimacy (Rotberg, 2003; Rotberg, 2002). Jackson, on the other hand, focussed on 
the inability of the state to provide basic civil conditions such as peace and physical security in its 
domestic setting as the primary condition of failure (Jackson, 1998). Jean-Germain Gros starts with 
the idea of the state in the ‘Weberian sense’ to include the notions of ‘territory, polity, authority 
backed by the monopolistic control of the legitimate means of coercion, and recognition at home 
and abroad’ which is then modified into a ‘modern state’ focusing on ‘extractive, 
protective/regulatory and redistributive’ capacities (Gros, 2011: 456). Gros then suggests a 
taxonomy of state failure which includes anarchic, phantom/mirage, anaemic, captured and aborted 
states. There are many other voices that present different ideas and lenses through which the 
‘typology of collapse’ could be understood (Kirschner, 2011: 568), as scholars and organisations such 
as OECD, World Bank and Fund for Peace etc. have come up with their own definitions. Brooks, in a 
similar vein, suggested that  
 
Successful states control defined territories and populations, conduct diplomatic relations 
with other states, monopolize legitimate violence within their territories, and succeed in 
providing adequate social goods to their populations. Failed states, their dark mirror image, 
lose control over the means of violence, and cannot create peace or stability for their 
populations or control their territories  (emphasis added; Brooks, 2005: 1160-1161). 
 
Based on this plethora of conceptualisations, some commentators like Mazarr lament the absence of 
a consensus on how to delineate the boundaries of the phenomenon (Mazarr, 2014), while others 
ask for the categories to be dismissed altogether because of their vagueness and instrumentalisation 
(Hill, 2005). At the same time, there are those, such as Rotberg, who insist that the presence of 
diverse perspectives should not be taken as the absence of a workable definition and that these 
accounts – such as his own proposition – serve well to understand the basic premise of the issues. 
But such notions are unable to account for the wider critique presented against the whole 
enterprise, which challenges the assumptions that lay at the heart of this discourse.  
 
It is granted that the definitional issues associated with the terms of state failure or fragility have 
created a variety of lenses that can be used to judge the relative stability or weakness of a state. But, 
there are two key aspects to note here. First, in the absence of a conceptual consensus, the states at 
the lower end of the stability-fragility spectrum are generally defined in contrast to the stable ones – 
the unsuccessful states emerge from an oppositional understanding of the successful states that are 
taken as the international legal-political norm (as the ‘dark mirror image’) (Brooks, 2005). This 
position suggests that there are certain characteristics that are readily apparent in a state authority, 
and the abdication of state responsibility, the non-provision of public goods, the presence of 
violence, and so on, lie outside the confines of so-considered normal state behaviour. It is this 
construction of the norm which is the key problem and which is common to both the conceptual 
definitions and the indices. Second, while outlining a negative definition and in the absence of a 
consensus on what a state actually is let alone a successful one, most of these definitional accounts 
admittedly take the Weberian ideal-typical state as their starting point. This construction, it is 
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argued here, misconstrues Weber’s own methodology and it serves only to reinforce the norm 
constructed by the definitional accounts. The idealised and mythical state that is taken as the 
criterion to judge, aid and reprimand fragile states is an ahistorical and apolitical entity that reeks of 
linear modernisation and colonialism. And, as will be discussed in the following sections, the tools 
that are geared towards measurement, ranking and classification of failed and fragile states fare no 
better against these critiques. 
 
Fragile State Indicators and Rankings: ‘If you cannot measure it, you cannot 
improve it’ 
 
Furthering the global trend of ‘governance at a distance’ through quantification and indicators (Davis 
et al., 2015), a number of indices and matrices cropped up in the last decade and a half to measure 
state fragility and potential failure. Brinkerhoff takes an optimistic view and suggests that these 
indicators and measurements have emerged to ‘tame the wickedness of the state fragility/failure 
problem set’ by bringing clarity in place of ambiguity, and adding transparency, consistency, ease of 
decision making, and policy harmonisation (Brinkerhoff, 2014). That may well be true, but the 
problems noted above are more pronounced in these indices and rankings, despite their attempt at 
simplifying and quantifying the essentially vague concept. The information, insights and critique 
offered later in this paper have emerged from an in-depth engagement with these rankings and 
indices. But before moving further in terms of discussing the indicators, it is necessary to provide a 
short overview of these matrices for those who may be unfamiliar with the field. 
 
Fragile States Index (FSI) 
 
The ‘Fragile States Index’ (FSI), previously known as the Failed States Index until 2013, is published 
by the Fund For Peace (and by Foreign Policy Magazine until 2014) and is perhaps the most well-
recognised state fragility indicator. It started off in 2005 (The Fund For Peace, 2005) with a 
benchmark of 60 states scored against a list of 12 social, political, economic and military indicators, 
further sub-divided into measurements on demographic pressures, refugees and IDPs, group 
grievances, human flight and brain drain (Social); uneven economic development, poverty and 
economic decline (economic); state legitimacy, public service, human rights and rule of law, security 
apparatus, factionalised elites, external intervention (political and military). The countries are 
allocated a score out of 10 against each of these indicators based on an analysis of media reports, 
and the scores are then averaged out to give an overall score which determines the rank of the 
country within the overall scheme. The list of countries has grown to 178 since then, which are 
categorised from ‘very sustainable’ as the least fragile to the ‘very alarming’ as the most fragile 
states (The Fund For Peace, 2019). 
 
The first FSI made express references to the US National Security Strategy and suggested that failed 
states threaten the ‘world’s equilibrium’ (The Fund For Peace, 2005: 56-57). The 2005 Index took the 
Weberian understanding of the state’s ‘monopoly on the legitimate use of force’ as the most 
important attribute of a failed state, although it also included other associated factors (The Fund For 
Peace, 2005: 58). It initially defined a failed or failing state as ‘one in which the government does not 
have effective control of its territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant portion of its 
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population, does not provide domestic security or basic public services to its citizens, and lacks a 
monopoly on the use of force’ (The Fund For Peace, 2006: 52). The turn towards fragility rather than 
state failure was an acknowledgement on the part of the Index that the emphasis had shifted away 
from ‘who is the world’s most failed state?’ to ‘trends and rate-of-change’ and performance over 
time (The Fund For Peace, 2019: 12). This gradual change was also visible in the move away from US 
security interests and foreign policy to transparency, global economy, aid effectiveness, governance 
infrastructure, economic stability and so on over the years.  
   
The FSI defines failed and fragile states negatively as failing to: have effective control over its 
territory, is not perceived as legitimate by a significant proportion of its population, does not provide 
domestic security or basic services to its citizens, and lacks a monopoly on the use of force. (p. 4) 
  
OECD ‘States of Fragility Report’ (SFR) 
 
The Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) initiated a proposal in 2005 
with the first report on ‘Monitoring Resource Flows to Fragile States’ in 2006 under the remit of its 
Fragile States Group. It analysed a list of 35 states taken from the bottom 40% of the World Bank’s 
Country Policy and Institutions Assessment (CPIA) list of 2003. As the name suggests, the initial push 
behind this exercise was to gauge the volatility, exclusionary effects and efficacy of aid flows into 
fragile situations (OECD, 2006) primarily linked to the Official Development Assistance from OECD 
countries. With volatility of aid taken both as a symptom of fragility as well as a contributing factor, 
the report acknowledged that fragile states on the whole were under-aided compared to their need. 
But while the OECD report is used by a number of donor organisations and countries and still 
monitors resource flows into fragile states (including development aid, foreign direct investment, 
trade surplus etc.), the ambit of the report and the conceptualization of fragility has become vastly 
expanded over the years.   
 
The initial years saw the OECD borrow the category of fragile states from the World Bank as a given, 
and stated that this category included countries ‘falling into the two bottom CPIA quintiles [with]… 
the group of highly fragile states is defined as countries falling into the bottom CPIA quintile’ (OECD, 
2007a: 27). In the following years, the report expanded its data to include the indicators and 
rankings produced by the Brookings Institution (Brookings Institution, 2008) and Carleton University 
(Carment and Samy, 2012) and started expanding its concept of fragility to include, for instance, 
institutional capacity (OECD, 2008). It also began to adopt political and developmental tones – for 
instance, a report issued in 2009 was titled ‘Ensuring Fragile States are not left behind’ (OECD, 2009) 
– but also by beginning to rank the states according to their dependence on aid, Foreign Direct 
Investment and so on (OECD, 2010). The 2010 report also mentioned for the first time, borrowing 
from a different report (OECD, 2007b), the OECD’s own definition of a fragile state as one where 
‘government and state structures lack capacity – or in some cases, political will – to deliver public 
safety and security, good governance and poverty reduction to their citizens’ (OECD, 2010: 20). 
 
From 2014 onwards, the social and development aspects, the logic of ranking and the linkages with 
other indicators (such as FSI) has seen an upward trend. The OECD reports have increasingly been 
concerned about the inability of fragile states to meet the Millennium Development Goals (OECD, 
2013), the declining aid to developing countries and the states’ performance against indicators 
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focusing on violence , access to justice, accountability and social inclusion etc. (OECD, 2015). The 
moral grammar – focusing on the problems faced and posed by the citizens of fragile states – has 
also strengthened over the years. The most important shift in the OECD categorisation is perhaps 
the adoption of the so-termed ‘Multidimensional Fragility Framework’ which measured and 
classified close to 60 countries according to the risks and the states’ coping mechanisms along five 
dimensions – economic foundations, environmental and health risks, political processes, overall 
security and violence, and societal cohesion (OECD, 2016). These categories are further subdivided 
into 52 indicators to measure the states or contexts of fragility. A significant aspect for the purposes 
of this paper is the indicator focusing on security (which includes the Weberian idea of monopoly 
over legitimate violence (OECD, 2016: 156-157) and the notion of the ‘state of fragility’ which adopts 
a holistic approach to look at the fragile situation afflicting the whole society and region in which the 
state, as just one of the many actors, has ‘weak capacity to carry out basic governance functions, 
and lacks the ability to develop mutually constructive relations with society’ (OECD, 2018). 
 
World Bank’s ‘Harmonized List of Fragile Situations’ 
 
The World Bank Group’s Fragile, Conflict and Violence Group (formally the Center on Conflict, 
Security and Development) annually releases its very brief classification of fragile situations and 
economies. Its significance comes from the fact that the list has previously fed into FSI and OECD 
reports, and continues to guide the policies of the World Bank, Asian Development Bank and the 
African Development Bank, along with other organisations. World Bank’s first list was compiled in 
the 2006 fiscal year as the Low Income Countries Under Stress List (LICUS) (2006-2009) and the 
concept and the list have evolved to the now titled Harmonized list of Fragile Situations (World Bank 
Group, 2019) as the World Bank’s own understanding of the development challenges in countries 
affected by violence and instability has developed over the years (Piffaretti et al., 2014). While the 
methodology and the workings of the indicators remain hidden, the classification suggests that the 
‘harmonization comes from averaging the World Bank Group’s CPIA [Country Policy and Institutional 
Assessment] scores with those of relevant regional development banks’ ratings to arrive at a 
harmonized rating of 3.2 or lower (World Bank Group, 2019). 
 
Other Indices and Rankings 
 
There are also a number of other active and inactive indexes and rankings that emerged alongside 
those mentioned above roughly around the same time. The Brookings Institution issued a report 
titled ‘Index of State Weakness in the Developing World’ in 2008 which has repeatedly used by other 
indices. It mapped 141 countries against 4 ‘baskets’, each with 5 indicators: Economic, Political, 
Security and Social Welfare. The report defined weak states as ‘countries that lack the essential 
capacity and/or will to fulfill four sets of critical government responsibilities: fostering an 
environment conducive to sustainable and equitable economic growth; establishing and maintaining 
legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing their populations from 
violent conflict and controlling their territory; and meeting the basic human needs of their 
Population’ (Brookings Institution, 2008: 3).  
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Carlton University has issued ‘Country Indicators for Foreign Policy (CIFP)’ reports every two years 
since 2006 to guide Canadian development assistance (Carment et al., 2017). This measures and 
ranks countries against 6 categories: Governance, Economics, Security & Crime, Human 
Development, Demography, Environment. DFID also issued its Fragile States and Regions List until 
2016. It understands fragile states and regions as those that ‘suffer external and social stresses that 
are particularly likely to result in violence [and] lack the capacity to manage conflict without 
violence’ (DFID, 2016). While the report is geared towards helping DFID in allocation of resources, 
the methodology behind the list is not too clear. 
 
Fault lines in the categorisation and conceptualisation of State Fragility 
 
One of the most interesting facets of these indicators is that almost all of them emerged in or just 
after 2005. While this is something that clearly requires more empirical and archival investigation, 
there are a number of factors that may explain this. First, the national security narrative gradually 
gained ascendancy in the post-911 era and resulted in international and unilateral conflicts in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. The crisis of legitimacy after the Iraq War may have also been a contributing 
factor. Second, linked to the security narrative, was the emergence of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) doctrine which, incidentally, was accepted as part of the UN General Assembly Resolution 
passed at the 2005 World Summit. The World Summit document, while not expressly alluding to 
failed states, mentions the problems that are generally attributed to state failure or fragility. Third, 
the development actors required clearer ideas on where the funds were being channelled and what 
was being done with them. In fact, the OECD document expressly mentions the ‘donors’ concerns’ 
that led to the first States of Fragility report (OECD Report, 2005).  
 
The emergence of these models all roughly around the same time cannot be a mere coincidence, 
and security interests, foreign policy concerns and donor funding may hold the key to understand 
the initial push behind them. But there are many significant conceptual questions that the indicators 
and the whole discourse on state fragility raises. For instance, from whose vantage point is the 
failure or fragility of the state gauged remains an unanswered question. This is because not all 
citizens groups and stakeholders may be equally disadvantaged by virtue of state fragility (Bøås and 
Jennings, 2005). Similarly, there are two common critiques of these indicators which, although not 
the central concern of this paper, nonetheless deserve to be mentioned as they feed into the 
arguments presented here. One is the general problem with quantification and calculability of 
complex social phenomena which is linked with the general neoliberal obsession with measurement. 
Critiquing this ‘measurement revolution’ in areas of rule of law and access to justice, Paliwala and 
Kamchadzera (2013) term this ‘justice indicatorology’ which is unable to transcend the issues of 
selection bias, the validity of data and often result in no real positive effect on the dynamics of 
development-related and rule of law interventions. Merry and others have shown how global 
governance indicators on the whole have emerged as a technology of global and technocratic 
governance, where international community and multilateral organisations create a normative 
environment which inevitably shapes the conduct of states (Merry et al., 2015). The rewards (aid, 
development finance, investment, etc.) and punishments (reputational damage, sanctions and even 
armed intervention) compel states into adopting the positions required by the indices and rankings, 
for better or for worse, even if it may not always result in real change on ground. In this sense, 
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indicators and rankings are both performative and normative (Nelken, 2015: 319) – they perform 
their role as a instruments of governance, and create a normative  and normalising environment by 
setting expectations and end-goals.  
 
Indicators, then, essentially set standards and are ‘placeholders’ for ideological and normative 
values (Davis et al., 2015). And even more significantly, through the creation of this normative 
setting, the indices and rankings sometimes replace the object to become the target of state’s 
economic and political activities and encourage (or compel) some countries to even try and play the 
system to their advantage. Fisher highlights, for instance, how Uganda maintains a contradictory 
stance when it comes to state fragility. While it portrays itself as a strong state to boost investor 
confidence by maintaining political stability and strong economic growth, Uganda also has an 
ambivalence with regards to solving the crises in conflict prone regions so that it can attract more 
financial and international assistance as a fragile state (Fisher, 2014). Heiduk suggests a similar 
gaming of the state fragility system by the military powers in Indonesia, who used the threat of 
‘balkanisation of Indonesia’ as the tool to strengthen their hold over the political regime (Heiduk, 
2014). 
 
The other common critique of the indicators and rankings focuses on the problems of quantification, 
and to their claims of objectivity and neutrality. Commentators suggest that in order to quantify and 
classify, those compiling indicators and rankings box complex socio-legal phenomena into neat 
categories, which are unable to do account for the various interlinkages that underlie these 
categories. The selection of these categories is not free from subjective decision-making, whether in 
terms of defining or choosing labels or assigning a score to the entities it chooses to classify. Through 
a detailed study of the development of state fragility indicators by the World Bank and OECD, Oliver 
Nay highlights that despite carrying normative and objective undertones, the development of OECD 
and World Bank indicators show that the assumption of political and ideological neutrality at the 
core of this enterprise is unfounded (Nay, 2013). At the same time, there are certain phenomena 
that escape all efforts aimed at quantification and measurement. State fragility indicators are unable 
to escape this challenge and critique. For instance, Nehal Bhuta (2015) highlights how the Fragile 
States Index and its data validation techniques are essentially subjective and non-transparent, which 
often produce results which can be considered both statistically invalid and scientifically non-
replicable.  
 
This paper argues that there are three even more fundamental problems with this whole measuring 
enterprise which not only critiques the state fragility classification, but also suggests that it may 
actually be harmful for the very same countries which are supposed to improve by virtue of this 
labelling. These are termed here as the problems of normalisation, of a-contextuality and of 
mythologisation of the ideal state. Each of these problems will be discussed below in turn. 
 
 
State Fragility and (a)normalisation 
 
Despite using different formulations and measurement criteria, the state fragility indicators are 
quite similar in their underlying approach. While their emphasis differs on governance, 
development, socio-economic stability, equality, openness of the society, on perceptions of 
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transparency, or on the numerous ways to calculate these, there is one stark conceptual similarity – 
the category of fragile state is negatively defined. The definitional accounts in the scholarly 
literature, as well as the conceptual models offered by the indices and rankings, take the state – and 
even more so a successful or stable state – as the starting point against which the fragile states are 
then defined. The quantification exercise is premised on the notion that attributes certain 
responsibility to the state and suggests that successful states are largely able to fulfil these 
obligations while the fragile and failed states are unable or unwilling to do the same.  
 
More importantly, indicators not only use the successful or stable state as a benchmark to judge the 
struggling or weaker states but that, in doing so, they construct a normative image of the 
international legal and political arena. This image suggests that the international arena largely 
consists of successful and stable (and normal) states, and paints the fragile or failed state as the 
anomaly. A weak state, in this light, is an occurrence that endangers international peace and 
security, that needs to be rooted out as a ‘degenerative disease’. The anomalous weak state, based 
on this, needs to be strengthened in order to become a functioning member of the international 
community. The norm presented by this image, however, does not stand up to scrutiny when the 
indices and rankings are closely examined. On the contrary, the indices and rankings, by virtue of 
their own rankings and measurements, highlight that state fragility is a far more ubiquitous and 
prevalent phenomenon than is recognised. 
 
The 2015 Fragile States Index that graded countries on the basis of a variety of military, economic 
and political indicators, for instances, paints the most interesting picture of this scenario. Out of the 
178 countries included in the report only 53 (29.77%) were considered to be in the range between 
very sustainable and stable. In fact, the index labelled Finland as the only country in the world that 
was considered ‘very sustainable’ (The Fund For Peace, 2015). On the other side of the spectrum, 
60% of the countries (107 out of 178) were considered to have a noticeable degree of state fragility 
and fell in the warning and alarming categories. The 2019 Index fares a little bit better, as it included 
seven countries in the range of ‘very sustainable’ states. However, the percentage of alarming, very 
alarming and problematic states still outweighs the supposedly sustainable and stable states by a 
margin with only 33.14% countries classed as stable/sustainable (The Fund For Peace, 2019). The 
Brookings Institution’s Index of State Weakness in the Developing World (2008) presented the same 
outlook. It put forth a classification of 141 developing countries of the world and highlighted that 
even the most stable among these (Slovak Republic), had less than desirable scores with regard to 
inflation and socio-economic rights. The OECD and World Bank reports further highlight this trend. 
The OECD fragility report, which has evolved over the years, accepted in the 2016 report that 75 
different countries of the world had been included in the most fragile category at one time or 
another in the last decade (OECD, 2018). While not the majority, 75 countries out of 178 can hardly 
be labelled as an anomaly.  
 
Examining the indicators as the very tool to measure state fragility and weakness shows that state 
fragility and weakness is present everywhere. What these indicators should emphasise, but do not 
do so explicitly, is the fact that state fragility is not an anomaly – and by some accounts it is the 
notional stability of states that is the exception rather than the norm. This is why the paper employs 
the idea of the ubiquity of state fragility. Brooks argues that ‘Weak, failing, and failed states are not 
the exception in many parts of the world…[but] the norm, and have been since their inception’ 
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(Brooks, 2005: 1174). We can take this even further and argue that it is not that the fragile state has 
been the norm in ‘some parts of the world’, but that the successful and strong state is a modern 
exception that is only present in some parts of the world. 
 
Not only is state fragility prevalent, but it is also present across various continents, while the so-
called stable states are geographically and contextually (and temporally) concentrated. The 
geographical limitation is obvious from the fact that most of the so-called successful and stable 
countries are located in particularly the northern hemisphere, and particularly in Europe. Out of the 
seven countries currently listed as stable in the Fragile States Index, three are Scandinavian 
countries, two in Western Europe while the other two are former European settler colonies (Canada 
and Australia). That this says something about the model of the successful state is one part of the 
problem. But even if the model and the formulation is analysed at its own terms, it shows that while 
stable countries are concentrated primarily in one part of the world, the fragile and stable countries 
are present in every continent and represent every part of the globe. The stable countries are also 
similar in terms of their history and politics. These are not postcolonial countries in the traditional 
sense of the term, they have not had military regimes or international invasions recently, were not 
part of neo-colonial economic experiments or enjoyed relative isolation when it comes to 
international law and politics. The fragile states, on the other hand, include countries with diverse 
histories and diverse socio-economic backgrounds. That most of them are postcolonial countries 
that have also been part of neo-colonial economic experiments makes for more than a mere 
coincidence. 
 
The question that may arise here is that we may be reading too much into the state fragility 
indicators to base the claim that state fragility is ubiquitous. There are two responses to this: One 
that the analysis uses these indicators precisely because they are hailed as the tools to measure, 
classify and diagnose state fragility and prescribe paths towards stability and it is therefore 
important to critically analyse them; and second, that the critique of these indicators reaches out 
beyond them to show that this problem afflicts the wider discourse as well. As indicated previously, 
the main critique being offered here is that the indicators construct a particular norm on the basis of 
which the fragile states are expected to follow the standards set by the international community. 
What this paper suggests is that the international community, and the standards it sets, are 
primarily an illusion based on partly the historical dynamics of dominance and partly on the 
conceptual hegemony of certain quantification and definitional models. This issue is further 
complemented by the absence of the wider socio-legal, historical and political contexts of the 
countries, which brings us to the next critique. 
 
The a-contextual nature of the indicators 
 
Another key problem, which feeds into creating an abnormal normality, is that these indicators are 
almost always a-historical and a-political. The indicators highlight a number of problems that affect 
the fragility and stability of states, but generally do not go into the details of the various trajectories 
that have brought these countries to the positions that they currently occupy in these classifications. 
Take for instance the case of Belgium and DR Congo which are generally placed at the opposite ends 
of the indicators and rankings. While Belgium is generally regarded as a ‘sustainable state’ (The Fund 
For Peace, 2019), DR Congo has gained notoriety for the protracted conflicts that have been raging 
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in the country over the last few decades, because of which it is deemed as one of the more fragile 
states around. 
 
However, what the indicators do not discuss adequately is the role that both Belgium and DR Congo 
have played in their mutual and respective historical trajectories. It is generally acknowledged that 
Belgian occupation of Congo was one of the most gruesome episodes of colonialism, even by 
colonial standards (Hochschild, 1999). The horrific violations of the rights and freedoms of 
individuals are commonly documented. What is less known is the fact that at the time of 
independence, DR Congo had around 30 people in the whole country who were university graduates 
and only 3 individuals who had any experience of working in senior civil service roles in the 
population of 20 million (Brock et al., 2012: 30). The ravages and impoverishment of colonial 
occupation meant that political independence was never going to result in the structural changes 
that were expected of the state. Similarly, as dependency theorists have suggested, development 
and colonialism are a two-way relationship. The resources drained from DR Congo made their way to 
Belgium and enabled the state to reach the position that it currently occupies. The case of many 
other colonial and colonised countries reflects the same realities. Branwen Jones, for instance, 
shows in detail how colonial legal experiments laid the foundation of the unrest and fragility that has 
plagued Somalia since 1991 (Jones, 2008).  In fact, the Fragile States index or OECD reports, in their 
almost 13 years of publication, do not acknowledge the historical role and the continuous structural 
problems of colonialism even once within their documents. 
 
States can only be judged by the same measures if and only if the measures are constructed to 
ignore the historical, political and socio-economic trajectories that each of these countries has taken 
to reach the point that it currently inhabits. When the majority of the states lie on the ‘alarming’ end 
of state fragility spectrum, the norm cannot pose successful states against the unsuccessful ones as a 
binary; rather, the role and formulation of the state in all these contexts needs to be approached in 
a different and context specific light. This highlights the significance of a theoretical and empirical 
examination of state-sovereignty, its nature, its formation and its role in the post-colonial and 
southern contexts, on their own terms (Eriksen, 2011; Brooks, 2005). While the indicators claim to 
undertake historical and political factors into account, they are only really interested in providing a 
snapshot of where the states are and how they can supposedly improve their respective futures. 
They suggest solutions such as end to civil strife, a strengthening of institutional frameworks, 
increasing citizens’ trust on the state. However, there is no acknowledgement by these indices of the 
structural or long-term (or ‘real’) historical and political reasons that led to the destruction of these 
societies in the first place. Without an acknowledgement of these matters, the suggestions by the 
indicators are bound to seem imperialistic and hypocritical. 
 
It is because of this reason that various commentators argue that the labels should be completely 
discarded. Hill, for instance, suggests that the colonial history at the heart of the fragile state 
indicators needs to be acknowledged and the taxonomies should be disbanded altogether. The 
argument further suggests that the assertion of a model state sounds too similar to a linear 
development and modernisation theory and reeks of (neo)colonialism. However, this paper suggests 
that while this is partially true, the problem at the heart of the comparisons with the model state are 
more complex. The absence of historical and political experiences of individual states, and especially 
by ignoring their colonial and imperial histories, means that ‘reproduction and entrenchment of 
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imperial structures and interventions is legitimized and normalized’ (Jones, 2008: 184). It is argued 
here that this works in two ways – by ignoring the role of the successful/stable states in laying down 
the course of fragility for the fragile states, but also by then placing the same ideals on the pedestal 
that laid the foundation for instability in most of the world. 
 
The ‘ideal-mythical’ successful state 
 
The indicators and the definitional accounts do not hide the fact that they are a-contextual and a-
political. At the same time, however, they do not acknowledge the claim that their matrices 
compare states to a Western European or Anglo-American model of statehood as claimed by critical 
commentators (Hill, 2005). On the contrary, they (implicitly or explicitly) suggest that the 
comparison is conducted against a notional successful state, and Western European states are 
coincidentally ahead of the curve. But where does this model come from? Even if the fragile state is 
considered the ‘dark mirror image’ of a stable/successful state, there is no consensus on what a 
stable state is, what the duties of a state are, or even on what a state is. But it is repeatedly 
acknowledged within the literature that the indices, and the scholarly accounts, take the Weberian 
ideal-typical state as their starting point. For instance, in one of its earlier reports, the FSI mentions 
that the indicator is based on a Weberian ideal type. This claim has been repeated by other indices 
within their formulations. 
 
However, it is important to note that there is a difference between what can be considered the 
Weberian understanding of state and the Weberian idea-typical model of statehood. The Weberian 
understanding of state – with the idea of ‘legitimate monopoly over the use of force or violence’ as 
its most recognised facet – is present within various accounts and in fact forms one of the core 
indicators for FSI. Some accounts go further and build on this to include service delivery and 
provision of social goods as the defining feature of the modern state. This brings us back to the 
problem of definitional ambiguity and conceptual complexity which, while important as already 
discussed above, is not the most significant aspect here. What is more important is the morphing of 
the Weberian ideal-typical model of state present within these accounts. It is suggested here that 
the indices and practitioners, rather than taking the ideal-typical state as a methodological category, 
have rather used it as a model for an ‘ideal’ state which creates a conceptual and political 
incongruity. 
 
Weber’s account of the state spread throughout his work is fragmentary and does not offer a holistic 
definition of the state in any of his writings (Anter, 2014). That this fragmentary account emerged 
from his understanding of the history (or histories) of statehood in Europe is an additional caveat. 
The most significant issue to dwell on, however, is that Weber’s sociological and historical 
methodology accepted that human societies and the associated legal-political entities are inherently 
complex phenomena, the analysis of which is not only difficult but also relies heavily on the 
observer’s worldview which leads to different selections of what constitutes as socially significant 
questions (Weber, 1949). His understanding of the ideal-type, and more importantly the ideal-
typical state for present purposes, is a way of cutting across the layers of social phenomena by 
taking a single category as the main tool of observation and analysis.  
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The ‘ideal-type’ concept itself is not about constructing an ‘ideal’ but about creating an idea by 
accentuating certain attributes ‘typical’ of a certain scenario. It is therefore a means to momentarily 
fix the complex and ever-transient social phenomena, long enough for the observer to understand 
how that category can be understood within its wider context (Weber, 1949). Hekman, suggests a 
useful three-step process to understand the methodological aspect of the Weberian ideal-type. The 
first step revolves around the determination of the historical or sociological category to provide a 
pivot for the analysis of the social phenomena (e.g., the state). The second step requires the 
historian or the sociologist to limit the category with regards to a ‘particular time period and, 
usually, a particular society’ (Hekman, 1982: 124). This requires the inclusion of certain historical, 
political and contextual data rather than a complete dismissal of it. And the final step involves 
accentuating particular typical elements of the selected category and contexts to observe their 
interplay. Hekman argues that the Weberian sociological and historical ideal-types may differ in 
terms of selection of facts, but nonetheless share the same epistemological foundation (Hekman, 
1982: 126). So while the ideal-type methodology does end up creating an entity that has not actually 
existed anywhere in reality, it does not mean that its links with history, politics and social contexts 
are divested, and nor does it intend to create a utopian or ideal version of this entity. This is where 
the indicators and the measurements as well as the definitional accounts make a crucial mistake 
 
The approach is reflected in Weber’s own work as well. In the ‘Objectivity in Social Sciences’, where 
he develops the idea of the ideal-type with clarity, he writes that while the ideal type is not ‘true’ 
reality, it nonetheless emerges from the empirical observation of the world and in this sense, it is 
closer to an empirical reality than an idealised version of reality (Collins, 1986). It is aimed at 
developing the observer’s ‘skill in interpretation in research’, and does not offer its own hypothesis 
(Weber, 1949: 47). It is therefore an ‘ideal limiting concept’ that limits, categorises and classifies the 
typical. In weber’s own words, 
 
An ideal type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by 
the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent 
concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly 
emphasized viewpoints into a unified thought construct (Weber, 1949: 48) 
 
The indices and rankings, however, seem to transform the ‘ideal-typical’ state into what the paper 
calls an ‘ideal-mythical’ state – it is an idealised version of state that is mythical in the sense of not 
being an actually-existing entity but also by being a self-referential and self-justifying category. The 
mythical here does not refer merely to the imaginary, but also presents a coherent organising 
category in its own right. While both ideal and mythical tend to indicate a move towards the 
fantastical, the utopian and the imaginary, myth goes further than the ideal in terms of creating, 
sustaining and furthering itself. Fitzpatrick notes that the ‘myth is creative not just in providing an 
origin but in being a sustained creative force extending itself’ (Fitzpatrick, 1992: 42). While 
incorporating the ideal within it, the mythical also hides the contradictions and ambiguities, the 
inconsistencies and the paradoxes in an apparent unity without ever directly addressing or revealing 
them (Fitzpatrick, 1992: xii). Significantly, as the limiting concept, the myth captures not only what is 
included in certain conceptual models along with their contradictions, but also captures its own 
origins as well as the horizons of all that could be otherwise (Fitzpatrick, 1992: 24).  
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It is for this reason that the paper suggests that the model of state used by the state fragility 
indicators is not only idealised, but moves from the ‘ideal-typical’ to the ‘ideal-mythical’ notion of a 
successful/stable sate. When the successful state is constructed as a myth, it tends to hide all the 
contradictions and ambiguities present in the concept, and merely serves to point towards the 
outliers – the fragile states. It sees the anomaly as the norm, and the norm as a dangerous 
aberration. An even more significant problem is the construction of the norm in a way that hides not 
only the prevalence and ubiquity of state fragility, but also hides the historical and continuous role 
of state success/stability in the creation of fragility elsewhere. That the ‘ideal-mythical’ state tends 
to be similar to modern Western experiments with statehood is evident. What is less evident is that 
once this state is held as a role-model for benchmarking, ranking and measuring all the states in the 
world, it simultaneously erases the states’ origins and trajectories as well as the origins and basis of 
the indices and formulations themselves. And in doing so, it is able to paint itself as neutral, 
objective, impartial, scholarly and helpful.  
 
This reinvention of itself as a neutral measurement, it is suggested here, is a double injustice for the 
majority of so-called fragile states especially the postcolonial states. First, as discussed previously, 
the definitional accounts and the indices ignore and hide the many injustices committed against the 
states through the colonial and neo-colonial enterprise; and second, the model against which their 
progress is judged compels them to become more like the countries that either benefitted from 
colonialism, or benefitted from the political-economies structured through colonialism and 
imperialism. This is a more nuanced challenge presented against state fragility matrices, and goes 
beyond the claim that fragile states are measured against European states, which is easily denied by 
the indices and organisations. But reversing the categories offered by these indices tells us what 
they present as their model of a successful/stable (non-fragile) state is: It is a state that is not a 
colonised state or if it is one, it tends to be a settler colonial state where the indigenous population 
was subdued and marginalised; it is not a state of what is called the global south; it is not an African 
state; and it is not an Asian state. It is an a-historical, a-political, a-contextual state that can be seen 
as a historical contingency at this particular juncture of humanity’s existence in the Western 
(generally European) hemisphere of the planet. 
Concluding remarks 
 
This paper is based on an in-depth engagement with the conceptual accounts present within the 
indices and matrices of state fragility. It has suggested that the indicators and rankings, in their 
attempt to apply a number to a state, divest the states from their historical, social and political 
contexts. They rely on an idea of state that is not only ideal but also mythical, in that it hides the 
ambiguities and contradictions that afflict the discourse, and carries the same undertones that 
guided development theories and propositions of historical-determinism of the past decades. In 
doing so, the indices invert the norm – they hide the prevalence of so-called state fragility and paint 
it as a dangerous anomaly that threatens the stability and success of other actors within the 
international community. This paper has suggested that this inversion of the norm and the a-
contextuality of the indices is unjust on two accounts: It downplays the role of stability in the 
creation of fragility in the world, but also because it compels the fragile states to follow the paths 
that they can and perhaps should not. 
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There are various different implications of the argument presented here. One implication is that we 
need to recognise that the category of state (and especially successful state) is itself contested and 
contingent, which should be reconsidered as an entity that cannot be universally invoked and 
applied. This may lead towards a discussion on democratic, decentralised non-state alternatives 
(Brooks, 2005). In this vein, some commentators refer to ‘hybrid political orders’ and call for a move 
away from any value judgements of the developing, postcolonial, transitional or failed and fragile 
states (Boege et al., 2009). The task here is to provincialize the strong, stable and successful state (or 
the modern Western state) rather than just the fragile and the failed state. The other implication is 
to gauge, understand and critique the role of the matrices and indices in global governance. The 
indices, once instituted, assume an autonomous role that often come to dominate the discourse and 
replace the initial object into becoming the centres of attraction and governance in their own right. 
At the same time, the indices remain vague, generally non-transparent and become instruments of 
furthering the policy agendas of whichever organisation(s) or state(s) they represent. 
 
As a final invitation, the paper would suggest that rather than looking at the so-called fragile states 
and why they are in the position that they currently occupy, the scholarly exercise should equally be 
devoted to how and why the successful states have achieved their respective positions. As stated 
previously, the non-recognition of historical pillaging of resources and gruesome violation of rights in 
the colonies is merely another form of the continuation of the same injustice. It is important 
therefore to look at the states within their ‘historically specific social forms and conditions, and their 
global relations’ rather than paint a one-size-fits-all idea of a successful state (Jones, 2008: 182). This 
may call for many different versions of ‘ideal-typical states’ including the colonised state, the 
colonising state, the imperialist state, the state making transition from conflict, the impoverished 
state, the historically and geographically isolated state, the debt-ridden state pillaged by internal 
and external actors, the state foreseeing its end due to climate change, and so on. Eriksen presents a 
postcolonial ideal-type in the same vein (2011), but it has to be balanced against a colonial ‘ideal-
type’ state that benefitted from this underdevelopment. What is required, then, is weeding out of 
false promises based on incorrect readings of states’ trajectories which will only prove elusive and at 
worst be harmful for the fragile states and the wider international community in the long run. 
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